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Most of us think that the world exists pretty much as it looks and sounds and feels to us. It seems 
to you that you are presently seated in a chair, reading this book, so you probably also believe it; 
you hold it to be true that you are sitting there, in the chair, reading. That it rarely occurs to you 
to articulate this sort of thought is irrelevant. All that matters is that, once pointed out, it seems 
obviously, perhaps trivially, true. Who would ever dare to question it? 
 But Thomas Anderson, likewise, believes himself to be a tax-paying, landlady-helping 
program writer for a respectable software company. (Of course, he also believes in his “other 
life” of criminal activity conducted under the hacker alias ‘Neo,’ but this life is kept hidden only 
from the authorities, and not from Anderson himself.) In this sense, Anderson’s beliefs about 
reality are like yours and mine, and as such they explain why it is so painful for him to learn that 
the world he thinks he lives in, the world as it appears to him every day, is not at all real. Instead, 
the comfortable realm in which Anderson seems to go about his ordinary life is in fact a vast, 
deliberate deception produced in his brain by a system of intelligent computers that grows, 
cultivates, and harvests humans as a renewable energy source. 
 As Morpheus explains to Neo, this illusory world, this “matrix,” is everywhere: 
 
It is all around us. Even now, in this very room. You can see it when you look out your window, 
or when you turn on your television. You can feel it when you go to work, when you go to 
church, when you pay your taxes. It is the world that has been pulled over your eyes, to blind you 
from the truth ... that you are a slave, Neo. Like everyone else, you were born into bondage, born 
into a prison that you cannot smell or taste or touch. A prison for your mind. 
 
Anderson and his contemporaries are fooled into thinking that they are out in the world reading 
books, watching football games, and engaging in other such activities. The truth of the matter is 
that they spend their whole lives confined to small containers that collect and distribute their bio-
electrical energy to computerized slave-masters. 
 When Neo first learns of this state of affairs, he becomes physically sick, and he tries to 
return to his previous (though artificial) life in the matrix. Neo’s crewmate Cypher finds the 
situation so awful that he agrees to betray Morpheus in exchange for a rich and important 
(though, again, artificial) life based upon the lies of the matrix. “Ignorance is bliss,” Cypher 
declares, as he completes his deal with Agent Smith (no relation). But even as these fictional 
scenarios horrify us, they can also provoke deep philosophical questions. Some scholars have 
even claimed that we might ourselves be caught up in a Matrix-like world of unrelenting illusion. 
Our aim here is to examine such claims in the spirit of Western thinkers like René Descartes. 
That is, we shall examine the hypothesis that we ourselves might now be living inside a matrix. 
In the end, we shall demonstrate that this idea is based upon a fundamental error, and that it 
represents at best an attitude of metaphysical rebellion. We shall also, in a concluding section, 
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examine the morality of Cypher’s choice to return to the matrix, arguing that his mistaken moral 
principles lead him to flawed judgments about serious ethical issues. 
 
Why You Might Be in a Matrix: René Descartes and the Malicious Demon 
In philosophy, the hypothesis that the world we see, hear, and feel might be an illusion is 
advanced by defenders of the position known as skepticism. Skeptics argue that we cannot know 
with certainty that the external world exists. Hence, they maintain that it is possible to doubt our 
knowledge of the external world, much as the main characters in The Matrix come to doubt the 
everyday world they seem to live in. 
 Skeptical hypotheses are especially attractive to two groups of people. First are adolescents, 
whose teen-aged rebellion against the easy certainties of parental authority sometimes takes a 
metaphysical form that leads them to declare that “Nothing is what it seems!” or that “I alone 
know what reality is like!” 
 Second, and more importantly, are philosophers, who themselves divide into two groups. To 
the first group belong philosophers who have not outgrown their metaphysically rebellious 
phase, and who thus find explorations of absurd and obviously false hypotheses exciting or 
glamorous. Philosophers in this first category may even profess to find the adolescent skeptics’ 
slogans plausible. But it is the second group of philosophers which is of most importance for us 
here. This second group comprises those, like Descartes, who see Matrix-like scenarios as useful 
tools for exploring fundamental questions about knowledge and reality. 
 In his classic Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes presents an influential skeptical 
argument designed not to prove that skepticism is true, but to establish a solid foundation for 
science. To accomplish this task, Descartes opens the Meditations by declaring his intention to 
suspend every one of his beliefs that he can find the slightest reason to doubt. Only those beliefs 
that are absolutely certain, in the strongest sense of the term, will survive Descartes’ test, and 
only such beliefs, he holds, can serve as truly reliable foundations for science. Thus, Descartes’ 
radical doubt is methodological in the sense that it is designed to serve an intellectual purpose; it 
is unlikely that Descartes would in fact deny all of the beliefs he suspends at this stage of his 
project. Their suspension is temporary only; it is a matter of heuristics. 
 First to go in this belief-suspension process are the beliefs that Descartes had formed on the 
basis of sensation.1 We justify many of our opinions with information collected through our 
senses of sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste. For instance, we believe that our roommate Jon 
has arrived home from school if we see him walk up the driveway, and we believe that he has 
locked himself out yet again when we hear him fumbling with the door. However, as Descartes 
notes, “From time to time I have found that the senses deceive.” This is especially true of our 
sensations in relation to very small or distant objects, but it also holds of other sorts of objects. 
The figure we take to be Jon could turn out to be a burglar; the fumbling could be the burglar’s 
attempt to break into the house. Because our senses sometimes deceive us, then, many of the 
beliefs that we justify on the basis of sensory evidence do not meet Descartes’ high standard, and 
so he puts them out of action. 
 Continuing this exercise, Descartes then suggests that even such relatively uncontroversial 
beliefs as that you are sitting in a chair and reading this book could be subject to doubt. Of 
course, such beliefs seem to be more trustworthy than your beliefs about Jon and about whatever 
he is doing on the porch. However, Descartes points out that we often make mistakes about 
                                                 
1 René Descartes (1985) The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. and ed. by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. 
Murdoch, and A. Kenny (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), p. 12. 
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precisely these kinds of things when we dream. When you are dreaming, it may seem to you that 
you are sitting in your chair, reading this book, when in fact you are fast asleep in your bed.2 We 
are unable to distinguish waking experiences from experiences of the sort we appear to have in 
dreams until after we awake, a notion that Morpheus affirms as he asks: 
 
Have you ever had a dream, Neo, that you were so sure was real? What if you were unable to 
wake from that dream? How would you know the difference between the dream world and the 
real world? 
 
Descartes himself concludes on the basis of his dream argument that sense experience is an 
unreliable justification mechanism, and so he suspends all beliefs he has formed on the basis of 
sensory evidence. 
 Descartes then carries his attack upon his own beliefs still further. While the dream argument 
gives us reason to doubt our opinions about the physical world, it seems to leave, for example, 
beliefs about numbers or geometrical figures unscathed. As Descartes writes, “Whether I am 
awake or asleep, two and three added together are five, and a square has no more than four 
sides.”3 However, Descartes concludes his first Meditation by considering the following still 
more radical thought experiment. Suppose, he says, that a “malicious demon of the utmost power 
and cunning has employed all his energies in order to deceive me.”4 Such a creature, Descartes 
argues, could easily lead us to mistaken conclusions about the sum of two and three or the 
number of sides to a square. This malicious demon could even more easily mislead us into 
thinking that there is a physical world external to ourselves, when in fact “[T]he sky, the air, the 
earth, colors, shapes, sounds, and all external things are merely the delusions of dreams which he 
has devised to ensnare [our] judgment.”5 Thus, Descartes concludes, “I shall consider myself as 
not having hands or eyes, or flesh, or blood or senses, but as falsely believing that I have all 
these things.”6 Having read Descartes’ first Meditation, then, it is difficult to imagine how we 
could show that our lives are not just grand deceptions created by a malicious demon. How could 
we ever refute the skeptical arguments advanced by Descartes? 
 Those who have watched The Matrix might surely, against this background, have reason to 
question whether we could ever rule out the possibility that the meaningful lives we think we 
lead are in fact a matter of deceptions implanted in our brains by intelligent computer systems. 
 
Why You Might Be in a Matrix, Continued: Peter Unger’s Evil Scientist and Hilary 
Putnam’s Brain in a Vat 
In a contemporary contribution to the debate on skepticism, Peter Unger -- himself a defender of 
the skeptical position -- suggests the possibility that we are all duped not by an evil demon, but 
by an evil scientist.7 In Unger’s scenario, presented in his 1975 book Ignorance, the common 
belief that there are chairs, books, and other similar objects in the world around us is simply an 
elaborate deception stimulated in our brains by an evil scientist, a super-neurologist who uses a 
computer to generate electrical impulses that are then transmitted to electrodes fastened to the 
relevant parts of our central nervous systems. Using these impulses to stimulate our brains, the 
                                                 
2 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
3 Ibid., p. 14. 
4 Ibid., p. 15. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Peter Unger (1975) Ignorance (Oxford, UK: Clarendon), pp. 7-8. 
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scientist deceives us into thinking that there are chairs and books, even though there are no such 
things in the world. Such a scenario has, Unger claims, the following implication; “No one can 
ever know [i.e., with absolute certainty] that there is no evil scientist who is, by means of 
electrodes, deceiving him into falsely believing there to be rocks,” and therefore, nobody can 
know that there are rocks.8 Likewise, you cannot know that you are in your chair, reading this 
book, for you can never know with absolute certainty that you are not subject to the 
manipulation of an evil neurologist, or for that matter, the manipulation of an evil, Matrix-like 
computer system. 
 Hilary Putnam pushes this skeptical science-fiction scenario even further in his 1981 volume 
Reason, Truth, and History. In Putnam’s version of the argument, an evil scientist deceives us 
not just about rocks, but about everything we think we perceive through the senses.9 Putnam 
begins by asking us to imagine that our brains have been surgically separated from the rest of our 
bodies and placed in vats filled with brain-nourishing chemicals. A powerful computer then 
sends electrical impulses into our brains, giving rise, for instance, to the illusion that we are 
sitting in chairs, reading books, playing tennis, and so forth. All the while, though, our 
disembodied brains are actually floating around in vats in the evil scientist’s laboratory. 
 Putnam presupposes that the computer program is sophisticated enough to generate proper 
feedback for the “actions” our brains attempt to initiate. For instance, should your brain try to 
rouse your body from your chair to fetch a snack, the computer could provide the appropriate 
impulses needed to convince you that you had in fact risen from your chair and carried yourself 
into the kitchen. But again, despite the appearance of eating, you would through all of these 
experiences remain a disembodied brain in a vat. 
 Having laid out this curious scenario, which is strikingly similar to the situation facing most 
humans in The Matrix, Putnam then poses the skeptic’s question: “How do you know you aren’t 
in this predicament?”10 Without an answer to this question, the skepticism inspired by Descartes’ 
original arguments remains like a sword of Damocles hanging over our heads. 
 
Relief From the Matrix: Arguing Against Skepticism 
Fortunately, non-skeptical philosophers have come up with a number of responses to the 
troubling questions about knowledge and reality raised by Descartes, Unger, Putnam, and The 
Matrix. First, it is important to note that the skeptic’s scenario is a mere possibility, and a very 
unlikely one at that. The fact that we take the trouble to follow Descartes in his exercise of 
systematic doubt is due in large part to its presentation in a special philosophical context: the 
context of Descartes’ own quest for perfect knowledge, knowledge of the sort that would live up 
to the highest ideals of science. Remember that, to Descartes, knowledge requires absolute 
certainty; we cannot be absolutely certain that an evil genius (or an evil computer system) is not 
deceiving us during sensation, so, Descartes argues, we cannot use sensation to justify our claims 
to knowledge. 
 A maximally strict standard for knowledge of this sort is perfectly appropriate in 
philosophical contexts where we are examining arguments for and against skepticism. In the 
ordinary contexts of everyday life, however, they are much too strict. For instance, if Jon asks 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
9 Hilary Putnam (1981) Reason, Truth, and History (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 5-8. Though 
Putnam himself does not use this scenario to argue in favor of skepticism, his work has made a powerful 
contribution to such discussions. 
10 Ibid., p. 6. 
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you about tomorrow’s weather forecast and you respond with questions like “Does weather 
really exist?” or “Does time really exist?” or “What is tomorrow?”, then Jon would, rightly, 
think that you had gone mad. This is because different standards for what properly counts as 
knowledge obtain in different contexts.11 In some philosophical contexts, we quite correctly 
impose very strict standards for knowledge. In everyday contexts, though, we equally correctly 
impose just those normal standards with which we are all familiar, and which are satisfied by the 
vast collections of commonsensical knowledge that we all share. In everyday contexts, then, we 
do indeed have knowledge of where we are sitting, of what we are doing, of current local 
weather conditions, and of the results of baseball games. 
 Thus, you do indeed know (in the fullest sense of the term) many things about yourself and 
the world around you; your beliefs about these things are both true and thoroughly justified 
through your everyday experiences. You know, for instance, that you are not currently dreaming. 
You know that Descartes (like Elvis) is dead. And you know that The Matrix is just a film. In 
addition, modern science provides massive amounts of additional, no less genuine knowledge -- 
that electrons are smaller than asteroids, that fish are not mammals, that the moon is not made of 
green (or any other type of) cheese, and so on.12 But if we do indeed possess these great and 
ever-growing stores of commonsensical and scientific knowledge, then, it follows that we must 
reject Descartes’ claim that knowledge always requires that very special sort of (philosophical) 
certainty that he demands in the specific context of his discussion of skepticism.13 
 Descartes’ fundamental epistemological principle to the effect that only knowledge marked 
by certainty is genuine knowledge has, moreover, problems of its own. Thus it seems to be self-
defeating, in the sense that its supposed truth would entail that it could not be known. As 
Theodore Schick, Jr. and Lewis Vaughn point out, “unless [skeptics] are certain that knowledge 
requires certainty, they can’t know that it does” (emphasis added).14 But in light of our 
previously noted doubts about Descartes’ principle, this principle begins to seem much less than 
certain. Indeed, our commonsensical and scientific beliefs are at least as dependable, if not more 
so, than Descartes’ principle. It was through acceptance of these beliefs, after all, that we were 
able to trust the evidence of our senses when reading Descartes’ own writings. Thus, we have 
good reason to doubt his claim that knowledge requires certainty. 
 We should keep in mind, too, another anti-skeptical argument advanced by the philosopher 
Bernard Williams.15 Williams soothes our fears of being locked in a perpetual Matrix-like 
dream-prison by pointing out that the fact that we can make a distinction between dreams and 
waking experiences itself presupposes that we are aware of both types of experience and of the 
difference between them. We can talk sensibly about the difference between the two only 
because there is a difference between them, a difference that we are aware of. As Williams 
                                                 
11 See David Lewis (1996) “Elusive Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74, pp. 549-567. 
12 This is not to deny the important role played by the doctrine of fallibilism in the advancement of science; that is, 
by the view that scientific theories must be subject to consistent testing against reality itself. Even evolutionary 
biologists remain open to the possibility that new evidence could be gathered to prove the theory of evolution 
mistaken; the fervor with which they attack such alternative theories as creationism is grounded, however, not 
in anti-religious bigotry, but in the tremendous amount of high-quality evidence that supports evolution. See, 
for instance, Theodore Schick and Lewis Vaughn (1995) How To Think About Weird Things (Mountain View, 
CA: Mayfield), pp. 211-219, for a lucid discussion of this issue. 
13 David Nixon raises a similar point in his contribution to this volume. 
14 Schick and Vaughn, p. 100. 
15 Bernard Williams (1978) Descartes (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press). 
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writes, it is only “from the perspective of waking [that] we can explain dreaming.”16 Thus, we 
can only make sense of the distinction between waking and dreaming itself if we really are 
awake sometimes, and since we can distinguish the two kinds of experience, it follows that there 
can be no serious reason to worry that our lives might be made up entirely of dream sequences 
that never end. 
 So, philosophy provides a number of tools for relieving the metaphysical uncertainty that a 
thoughtful viewing of The Matrix might at first provoke. Since our knowledge -- of where we are 
sitting, of what we are doing, of what the world around us is like -- does not require 
philosophical certainty, but only those sorts of strong, context-appropriate justifications which 
we employ for everyday and scientific purposes, it follows that we can use the good reasons we 
have for believing in the external world to justify our claims to knowledge not only about the 
existence of this world, but also about its nature and constitution. As Martin Gardner puts it: 
 
The hypothesis that there is an external world ... is so obviously useful and so strongly confirmed 
by experience down through the ages that we can say without exaggerating that it is better con-
firmed than any other empirical hypothesis. So useful is the posit that it is almost impossible for 
anyone except a madman or a metaphysician to comprehend a reason for doubting it.17 
 
 
Morality and the Matrix: Cypher’s Mistake 
In the grips of the sort of skeptical doubt inspired by Descartes and The Matrix, we might be able 
to empathize with Cypher as he cuts his despicable deal with Agent Smith. Tired of the misery of 
the real world, Cypher agrees to lead Smith to Morpheus in exchange for a new life as a wealthy, 
famous actor inside the matrix. Cypher knows that the matrix is not real, but he believes that he 
can make his life better by simply ignoring this and retreating back into a pleasant world of 
illusory fantasy. 
 Cypher is making a big mistake here, however. In choosing to lead his life for pleasure alone, 
he presupposes that pleasure is the only thing that could make his life worth living. The doctrine 
according to which pleasure is the only thing valuable for its own sake is known to philosophers 
as hedonism.18 Though hedonism may seem to have some intuitive appeal, the philosopher 
Robert Nozick provides a powerful argument against it in his Anarchy, State, and Utopia. This 
argument is especially interesting for us here, because it involves yet another brain-in-a-vat-type 
thought experiment.19 
 To begin, Nozick again suggests that we might simply be unconscious bodies floating in vats 
of nourishing chemicals. He postulates something called the “experience machine,” a 
sophisticated piece of computer equipment that uses electrodes to stimulate our central nervous 
systems. Using the experience machine, neurophysiologists could make it seem to us that we are 
reading books, meeting with friends, drinking beer, and doing other pleasant things. All the 
while, though, we would in fact merely lie dormant inside the machine. Assuming that the 
experience machine could be configured to generate any experience we think worthwhile, that it 
                                                 
16 Williams, p. 313. 
17 Martin Gardner (1983) The Whys of a Philosophical Scrivener (New York: Quill), p. 15, quoted in Schick and 
Vaughn, p. 87. 
18 Hedonism is one fundamental component of utilitarianism, a moral philosophy that holds that an action’s moral 
value is dependent upon the total amount of happiness that it produces. The two founders of utilitarianism were 
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill; see Jeremy Bentham (1948) An Introduction to the Principles of Morals 
and Legislation (New York: Hafner) and John Stuart Mill (1979) Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: Hackett). 
19 Robert Nozick (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books), pp. 42-45. 
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could be programmed to make us seem to be wonderfully successful, rich, happy, and beautiful, 
Nozick asks, “Should you plug into this machine for life?”20 
 Cypher, of course, would answer “Yes.” Most of us, though, are rightly much more cautious. 
For there seems to be something troubling about the idea of turning our lives over in this way to 
mere stimulation by electrodes.21 Nozick explains why this is so with a series of arguments 
against those who, like Cypher, would choose to submit to the experience machine. First, he 
says, “We want to do certain things, and not just have the experience of doing them.”22 Neither 
the experience machine nor the matrix allows for genuine, meaningful action; instead, they 
merely give the appearance of meaningful action. But in addition:  
 
We want to be a certain way ... [but] someone floating in a tank is an indeterminate blob. There is 
no answer to the question of what a person is like who has long been in the tank. Is he coura-
geous, kind, intelligent, witty, loving? It’s not merely that it’s difficult to tell; there’s no way he 
is.23 
 
Finally, the experience machine does not allow us to connect with reality in any substantial way, 
despite the strong desires most of us have to do so.24 Thus, Nozick concludes, “We learn that 
something matters to us in addition to experience by imagining an experience machine and then 
realizing that we would not use it.”25 Likewise, we learn that something matters to us besides 
pleasure (or fame, or wealth, or beauty) by considering Cypher’s decision and then realizing that 
we would not make it. Cypher’s decision is, in fact, immoral. In contrast, Neo’s decision to face 
“the desert of the real” allows him to undertake genuine action and have genuine experiences 
that give his life meaning, and thus a moral value. As the moral philosopher John Stuart Mill 
writes, “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates 
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.”26 
 
Conclusion 
The Matrix exposes us to the uncomfortable worries of philosophical skepticism in an especially 
compelling way. However, with a bit more reflection, we can see why we need not share the 
skeptic’s doubts about the existence of the world. Such doubts are appropriate only in the very 
special context of the philosophical seminar. When we return to normal life we see immediately 
that they are groundless. Furthermore, we see also the drastic mistake that Cypher commits in 
turning his back upon reality and re-entering the matrix. Not only does reason compel us to 
admit the existence of the external world, it also requires us to face this world, to build for 
ourselves meaningful lives within it, and to engage, as adults, in the serious business of living. 
                                                 
20 Nozick, p. 42. 
21 Even the great utilitarian John Stuart Mill seems to have been troubled by this sort of objection to hedonism. In 
responding to his own (and to Bentham’s) critics, Mill tried to distinguish different kinds of pleasure, some of a 
higher and some of a lower quality. 
22 Nozick, p. 43. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., p. 43-44. Continuing, Nozick points out that: 
 
This clarifies the intensity of the conflict over psychoactive drugs, which some view as mere local experience 
machines, and others view as avenues to a deeper reality; what some view as equivalent to surrender to the experience 
machine, others view as following one of the reasons not to surrender! 
 
25 Ibid., p. 44. 
26 Mill, p. 10. 
